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RELIGION AND BELIEF 
by 
J. Calvin Keene 
ll is a great privilege to be associated with Professor Blanshard in this venture of 
philosophic exchange. I have been asked to participate as a "practitioner", which I 
assume suggests that I "do" both philosophy and religion and should make personal 
responses on both topics, emphasizing the religious aspect since therein lies m y  
chief competence. A s  a modem person I am, of course, i n  basic agreement with tthe 
thesis that religion needs reason and lhat belief should be made as rational as 
possible. How far reason can establish or disprove religious belief is another matter, 
buc with lhe statement that it is necessary to guard against error and too-easy belief 
I am in complete accord. Further, I am particularly pleased to accept the thesis tihat 
it is an ethical responsibility to believe the truth. I understand Professor Blanshard 
to be saying that even when false beliefs do not lead to harmful effects 
they are still ethically wrong and reprehensible because they viol.ate the obligation 
to seek the truth which. because he is rational. every human being has. In so far as 
error can be identified or th,e truth known it behooves all men to avoid the former 
and hold to lthe latter. 
Turning now to the paper itself, my first point at issue is that of the meaning of 
the word "belief". Exactly lnow it is being used seems to me somewhat unclear. 
Much of the time it appears that "belief" for Professor Blanshard carries with it the 
assu mption of certainty, so that one holding a belief in religion, for instance, is 
convinced beyond doubt or question that the belief is true and therefore he should 
resist any rational investigation of it. In the latter part of the essay, it seems that 
dogma is identified with belief. Further, Professor Blanshard states at one point 
that he would have no objection to the beliefs in religion if they were considered to 
be hypotheses and probabilities, but that is not how religious men consider them. 
Let !IS look briefly at these points. 
As normally used, the word "belief" does not imply certainty, for when certainty 
is achieved, we have knowledge, not belief.A good dictionary definition of belief is: 
"confidence in the truth or existence of something not immediately susceptible to 
rigorous proof." In believing, then, one accepts, he has confidence, but he knows 
that what he accepts is less than certain and is not fully demonstrated. U, as the 
paper suggests we should do, one accepts only as far as the evidence proves and 
never beyond it, there would be no belief, only certainty. The biblical statement, "I 
believe, help thou mine unbelief" illustrates the point sufficiently. 
It follows, therefore, that belief and dogma are not identical. The former is an 
a<;sertion of acceptance or confidence, but beyond certainty; the latter consists of 
doctrines or creeds asserted to be true and accepted as such on the basis of 
authority. Belief always includes an element of tentativeness, a recognition of less­
than-complet e  certainty. If this is a valid statement, then beliefs. even for the one 
holding them, are in fact hypotheses and probabilities and are known to be such 
even when one has taken the "leap of faith" into them. It is true that dogma does 
not admit of such tentativeness and the references to the early Church Fathers have 
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to do with dogmas that may not be rejected. But to consider this question further 
would be to change our subject from the ethics of belief lo tbe ethics of dogma. 
Faith also, like belief, contains an element or tentativeness and uocen.ainty. To 
stale '1his is my faith' is very different from saying 'this is certain'. As indicated in 
Professor Blanshard's paper, faith has belief at its center but is a more inclusive 
term, 1containing also trust and commitment. Faith is an act both of the mind and 
the will. 
It is several times stated in the paper thal the rational, ethical man should not 
believe beyond the evidence. whether in religion or elsewhere. Might one properly 
inquire whether the very nature of science is not such that it holds beliefs and that it 
is these which make for its creativity? True, the beliefs of science, which we call 
hypotheses, are held tentatively. Yet this is frequently forgotten, since so long as no 
evidence to the contrary is discovered, the hypotheses are held to be "laws" and 
accepted as "true" much as religious men hold to their bellefs. lo fact, is it not also 
true that there is no single "law" of science which is known to be certainly and 
finally valid? In asking this, I am not losing sight of the fact that science stands 
ready to change its theories as soon as evidence requiring the change is found. 
E'idence in re ligion that clearly contradicts its beliefs is much harder to come by. 
My point, in spite of this, is that if we must foUow the evidence only so far as it takes 
us. then we have no basis for speaking of final "truth" either in religion or in 
cience. Both yield only beliefs of differing orders of probability, for none of what is 
belie\'ed can be held to be certain without qualification. Carrying the point to its 
extreme, is it not true that there is only one statement which can be accepted as 
true without qualification. and that this is Descartes' "cogito," which is possibly 
best stated, as William James does, as "the truth that the present phenomenon of 
consciousness exists"? If all this is accepted. then the assumption that we do have 
sufficient evidence for truth, so that reason can move forward smoothly without 
ever geuing beyond the evidence, is found to be a demand that can never be 
fulfilled, either in religion or in areas of other knowledge. Man finds no resting 
place ijn his constant search for that certainly which he longs to grasp. 
I I  
Let us next briefly investigate the bases of religious belief. Religion, we find, is 
related to a very different reality than is science, for in religious and philosophical 
terminology, science studies the dependent and contingent world, the world of 
constant change. the created world. while religion is concerned with the Creator, 
God. the independent and necessary Being, the ground of all, and with His relation 
to man. God is not an object, but is the foundation of values and ideals and the 
source of man's possible happiness. Science and religion exist, then, on two clif· 
ferent planes and the sort of evidence and the methods of acquiring evidence 
appropriate:: to the one are not applicable to both. The knowledge of science begins 
in what the senses make available lo Lhough.t, and without the senses there could be 
no thought or knowledge. We are told that nature answers "yes" or "no" co our 
questions. It is we. the in,•estigators, who ask the questions of nature and exercise 
control over it as we achieve knowledge. But just as God is other than nature so is 
religion other Lban science, although it, 100, l>tarti> in exp�rience. As ultimate, 
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elemal. creathe Bemg. God stands i n  lhe superior posilion in relalion l o  us in our 
earch for lruth about Him Humility and openness are required on the parl or man. 
We learn or our fellO\\ human being only as he "opens" himself lO US and "re,eals" 
in that openness the kind of person be is. As a person, he cannol be studied as an 
object of physical nature might be examined. Our knowledge of God is gained in a 
some-what similar way. Only as we are in the prope r receplive atlitude before Him 
and ac; lie reveal'! Himself 10 our minds and wills can we arrive at genuine ex­
perience of Him. And again. as our abilily to know another person depends to a 
large degree upon our own spiritual qualities and our sensitivity toward him, in a 
similar wny God's revelation to man will depend partly upon man's own capacity 
for "taking in" the truths of God. The "I-Thou" relation is a very different one from 
that of a scientist to a subhuman object. 
All of the great religions arise in intense experiences men have had of the Divine. 
These men are the great prophets and mystics. They become aware of God's reality 
and in their experience know much of Him, but they know also that the God they 
experience remains a mystery beyond words, even as experienced. To the prophe ts 
comes a message from God to His people. and he and lhe people are required to 
ghe humble obedience. Mystics, on the other hand, find in their sense of oneness 
\\.llh God and their awareness of Him, their center of meaning and ' alue. For both, 
the ultimate has made Him.self known and has shown the WCJ)' of life which leads to 
"sahation". Through revelation of God. meaning. demand, and certitude con· 
ceming lhe goodness of being have clearly been made manifest. Man finds that lhe 
search for l he \\ ay to the goal of life has been answered. 
The words used to describe such experiences and the effects of these experiences 
are thus seen lo be \cry different indeed from man's experience of nature. The 
prophets and mystics are the "seers" of our race. There have been only a few great 
ones (as there also have been few great philosophers) - men such as Abraham, 
Moses. the Hebrew prophets, Jesus, Mohammad, the Hindu and Buddhist mystic.s. 
If even a score of these men had not lived, human life would be greatly different. 
for ii is they who have provided the foundations of religions and cultures: the 
Jewish, Chdstian Muslim, and Hindu, for example. The great majority of men have 
not received comparable revelation, yet most human beings and possibly all have at 
times experienced the deep longing. the "restlessness of heart" (which Augustine 
understood to be man's need of God). the times of deep infilling and inspiration, 
and 1he sense of demand being laid upon them. which are sufficiently similar in 
kind 10 the experiences of the prophets and mystics to make it possible for these 
modem men lO recognize in the earlier figures lheir truth and authority. 
It 1c; nC"ct>c;c;ary alc;o to point out that each of these men could understand God 
only in terms consistent with himself, terms which reflected his personality and lhe 
influence of his age and cuJture. for both the God re,ealing him elf and the one 
recen ing lhis re,elalion appear in the declaration made by the experiencer. Moses' 
descripuon of God is not lhat of the Second Isaiah nor that of Jesus. God did not 
change, but Moses was not Deutero-lsaiah nor Jesus. Yet they all spoke of God, 
and spoke truth of Him, e"en if more or less fully. 
My point is that religious experience is required in order to have religious belief 
and faith, much as sensory experience is basic to science. Reason enters into 
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religious experience in order to examine it, to remove contradictory declarations, 
to find its relation to other human experience. Therefore, reason cannot hold a 
veto over religious experience as such. It stands independent even though reason 
may interpret and relate it. The insight into God arising from experience cannot be 
reached by reason, yet reason has its highly important work to perform. Those who 
attempt to interpret rationally and in unified form what bas come to us from the 
''seers" are che theologiians who, of course, assume the original revelation to be true 
as a matter of faith and even of dogma and attempt to give a coherent account of 
God, the world, man's purposes, an account which is logically relevant to the 
central truth. 
Christianity as it was expressed during the Middle Ages and since can be un­
derstood in this way. It demanded that the Scriptures, the dogmas, and the creeds 
be accepted without question, believing chat they carried the essential aspects of 
the original revelation from Christ. These ruled out error, it was believed, and they 
provided the a priori basis of thought for those who would study faith by reason. 
The great thinkers, whether Thomas, Augustine, Erigena, Anselm, or even 
Ockham. agreed that the faith as thus given was true. Only if they had been 
prepared to surrender their status as Chriscians could they have done otherwise, for 
had they done so they would have separated rthemselves from the revelation and as 
theologians would have had no faith from which reason could begin its work. The 
basic truths of Christianiry as thus accepted were not the product of reason but 
were accepted as given, in and through revelation. This was the ultimate faith of 
Christians during the Middle Ages. 
Each of the great theologians, starting with these elements of faith, had recourse 
to reason, as suggested above. Some, like Abelard, felt free to reject the in­
terpretations given the scriptures by church Fathers and Councils, preferring their 
own rational conclusions. The work of these men served to develop the im­
plications of the truths received, to interpret them for daily life, to relate them to 
the world of man. And I believe it correct to say that never has reason been used 
with greater care and greater respect for logical accuracy than it was by the 
Scholastics. and particularly by Thomas Aquinas. To sum up, reason is of very 
great importance to religion and must be used with the greatest responsibility, but 
reason cannot replace revelation nor can it disprove it - such is the understanding 
religion has of itself. 
III 
Returning again to the main emphases of Professor Blanshard's pape�. we ask 
what kind of evidence religious belief ought to seek, in the mind of the paper's 
author? The question seems not to be answered clearly, although i t  is clear that the 
scientific method for finding truth is not the way. The only other likely way of 
demonstration is the rationalistic method, which is that of logical consistency and 
coherence. To speak of gaining evidence for belief when this method is used is a far 
more sophisticated matter and far less certain a one than the kind of evidence 
welcomed in science. Let us now consider the rationalistic approach briefly. 
Rationalism starts with a priori truths - truths considered so evident and so 
certain in themselves that they require no justification. In a way, these a priori 
truths hold the position in rationalism which revelation holds in religious thought. 
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Dcsc:irte'> held as a priori that what i s  clear and distinct i s  true. We recall his 
argument that inc� the concept of God was to him clear and distinct. and since he 
ll'> finite man could not have created the concept of infinite Being. therefore God's 
t:xistencc " as established. Other rationalists ha\'e held to other a priori ideas and 
rejected that of Descartes. Professor Blansbard suggests that the knowledge that 
"'lo'c '"better than hatred. happiness than misery. enlightenment lhon ignora nce is 
. . .  an independent insight which may be had with equal clearness by Christian, 
Buddhist, and secularist." Most of us, as secularists or as Christians. would very 
likely agree wi th I his statement. but still might question whether these are self­
cvident concepts. Certainly not every person does agree that they are self-evident, 
even am<,ng the philosophers. The only proposi tion that may be considered as 
undeniably a priori is. I believe, as mentioned above. the "I think, therefore 1 am'' 
of Dcl\curte), or the "I doubt. therefore 1 am" of Augustine. But this is not an a priori 
upon which alone any �ystem of thought can be securely constructed. 
The rationalist starts from his a priori beginnings and finds the test for the truth 
of his system in coherence. This test asks whether the system of thought developed 
by the rationalist does in fact do justice LO human experience in aU of ils many 
manifestntions. and provide organization for these manifestations in terms of their 
relatl\ e importance. Superficially. this appears to be an excellent test for truth, but 
\\hen we put rationalisuc systems of thought themsehes to this same lest, we find 
lhm there is little agreement as co their coherence. Consider, for instance, the three 
great philosophical systems of Descartes. Leibniz. and Spinoza. Each of these men 
had his a priori tarting points. each was logically consistent, and each belie,ed his 
re ults to be coherent. But could anything be more dh ergent and contradictory 
than these systems? 1C we compare them \\ith the theology of St. Thomas, does it 
not appear that his great Summa Theologica did in fact bring about an amazing 
coherence which far <iurpassed lhat of any of Lhe rationalists? The feet is, of course. 
tha1 the judgment as to the relative importance of the various aspects of human 
experience is precisely where men disagree most widely, hence it is al this point 
where disagreement concerning the degree of coherence will most surely arise. The 
conclusion appears lo be, therefore, that while the test of coherence is a useful one, 
it is by no means a 1cs1 which yields certainty. If this is the kind of evidence 
required 10 support religious belief, it is a kind which still falls short of proof. To 
speak of "insufficient evidence"' supporting religious belief on this basis is 
<,omething of a punier. 
IV 
fhe problem of finding "valid evidence" for the nature of God or for im· 
mor1ah1y. 10 be speciric, is a 'ery difficult matter from the standpoint of reason. 
Professor Blnnshard's paper both recognizes this difficulty nod seemingly 
minimi1es it. Let us take the latter point first. �eference is made to the practice of 
Henry S1dg"ick of withholding his negations concerning personal beliefs in 
Christian theology from his students in order to contribute to their happiness. His 
o;enslli�uy toward his students is praiseworthy, but would it not be desirable to 
know what his doubts were based upon, in order to know whether he had evidence 
lo support them? The iUustration apparently was used to show that it is sometimes 
better "to leave ignorance and error undisturbed." But is it not a strange kind of 
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judgment that lhe believing studen1s are considered to be in  ignorance and error 
while the one man who doubts apparently is fully justified in bis doubting? Perhaps 
I have misunderstood the point, but a somewhat similar one appears at the very end 
of 1he essay in reference to the death of T. H. Huxley's son. It would appear that lhe 
truth of unbelief should need establishing as much as does the truth of belief. In this 
account. Huxley supports bis grief and sense of hopelessness concerning his 
deceased son by recommending that one "sit down before fact as a little child." 
This is no doubt exceUent advice in evaluating scientific theories, but the im­
plkation seems to be rbat somehow Huxley had faced the "facts," had discovered 
justifying evidence on the side of unbelief, and was acting nobly when he followed 
his truth regardless of the pain it caused him. But is it not appropriate to wonder 
what facts, what evidence he had obtained which so thoroughly disproved any form 
of immortality? Others who are familiar with his philosophy seem not lo be 
similarly impressed by his evidence. The ethics of belief must be an ethics that 
applies both to belief in religion and also to belief in ideas opposed to religion. 
Professor Blanshard recognizes the difficulties of finding certainty in religion in 
the discussion toward the end of his paper. where he aUows what seems to me a 
strange transition to take place. For, if I understand him correctly. he said earlier 
that religious be lief should always be justified by reason as a matter of ethical 
principle. This he seems to support as a universal rule, applicable to all men as 
believers. But in the latter pan of the paper he writes that the "plain man" is an 
exception to this, in terms of his own searching for the truth o! his beliefs. We are 
told that he is too busy, too occupied with the work of the e,•eryday. Therefore it is 
expecting too much to suppose that he is capable of applying himself effectively to 
these great problems. What, then. can he do? He must tum to the experts, the 
specialists. who do have the time and the ability to probe into these matters. But 
then it is added that those who speak with authority "notoriously disagree"! The 
plain man's responsibility cherefore lies at the point of his making a choice between 
them, of appraising their relative weight. 
This. strikes one as an unexpected turn in the argument, for at first it appeared 
that one should be held responsible for his own beliefs, bul now not only is it said 
this is not the case, but it is admitted that those lo whom we are advised to turn will 
themselves disagree! But I thought we were looking for a degree of certainty for 
our beliefs which would justify our holding them! Assuredly ii we rely on 
disagreeing authorities then we are most miserable. caught in all the relativities of 
scholarly differences of opinion! And not only so, but if a man is inco�petent to 
deal with the issues himself, how then can he be competent to choose the proper 
a11thnri1y wisely? Ts it not only if he is awart> of the pnc;c;ible vie� :inci approache.<i, 
which his preoccupation elsewhere bas ruled out, that he might choose widely? But 
lhis is denied him. 
Some years ago at meerings of a theological society at which views of Or. Paul 
Tillich were being discussed and criticized. the famous scholar Professor Reinbold 
Niebuhr prefaced his criticisms by remarking that he believed 1hem valid if he 
understood Dr. Tillich properly! In his response to criticisms, Dr. TiUich replied, 
"But of course Profes or Niebuhr does 1101 understand me"! Professor Blanshard 
may well say che same in response to my comments. 
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